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A Critique of the Second Circuit’s Analysis 
in Nicholas v. Goord 
 
JOHN DORSETT NILES* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ortunately for law enforcement officers, every human 
being leaves behind a small number of cells wherever he 
goes—including a crime scene.1 Each cell contains 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a substance that carries the 
individual’s genetic code.  Genetic code is very likely unique 
to each human being, and law enforcement officers have used 
this fact since the 1980s to help solve crimes: They have 
compared DNA collected at crime scenes against DNA from 
known individuals to help either prove or disprove the 
individuals’ presence at the crime scenes.2 
In part to help law enforcement officers use crime scene 
DNA, every state has enacted a law allowing the state to 
create and to maintain a database of human DNA.3  Because a 
larger DNA database makes for a better DNA database, every 
state also has enacted legislation aimed at increasing the 
number of individuals whose DNA its database catalogues.  
Many of these “DNA-indexing” statutes operate coercively, 
compelling certain classes of individuals (usually convicted 
felons) to provide their DNA.4  Affected individuals often 
object that these statutes overreach Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
* Candidate for J.D., 2008, Duke University School of Law. 
Candidate for M.A., Economics, 2008, Duke University Graduate School. 
I would like to thank Amanda Cooper and Keri Garcia for their editorial 
assistance. 
1 Shaila K. Dewan, As Police Extend Use of DNA, a Smudge Could 
Trap a Thief, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A1. 
2 Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnet —A Constitutional Catch?, 54 DRAKE 
L. REV. 15, 16 (2005). 
3 Id. at 16–17. 
4 See, e.g., 1994 N.Y. Laws 737, § 1 (codified as amended at N.Y. 
EXEC. LAW § 995-C(3) (McKinney 2004)) (requiring felons convicted of 
certain specified crimes to provide a DNA sample for inclusion in New 
York’s DNA database). 
F    
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bounds.  Lawsuits in over thirty jurisdictions have challenged 
DNA-indexing statutes’ constitutionality.5  This Case Note 
focuses on one such case, Nicholas v. Goord.6  
 The Case Note proceeds as follows.  Part I traces the 
historical and procedural facts underlying Nicholas.  Part II 
describes the legal backdrop against which the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided the case.  
Part III steps through the Second Circuit’s majority opinion, 
and Part IV critiques the opinion.  Part V concludes the Case 
Note by discussing the ramifications of Nicholas for future 
DNA-indexing cases. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
In Nicholas v. Goord, nine prison inmates challenged the 
constitutionality of New York’s DNA-indexing statute.7  
Pursuant to that statute, government contractors extracted 
blood from each plaintiff, analyzed that blood for unique 
DNA strands, and then catalogued those unique strands in 
New York’s DNA database.8  The inmates claimed these 
actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights.9  They sued 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and to have their DNA 
expunged from New York’s DNA database. The 
Commissioner of the New York State Department of 
Correctional Services, the Director of the New York State 
Division of Criminal Justice Services, the private blood-
testing company that extracted the prisoners’ blood, and one 
of the company’s employees were the named defendants.10 
The inmates’ lawsuit implicated several provisions of 
New York’s DNA-indexing statute. The statute, as it existed 
at the time of the lawsuit, compelled all individuals who had 
been convicted of certain felonies to provide a DNA sample 
                                                 
5 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830–31 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(collecting cases). 
6 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005). 
7 Id. at 652. 
8 Id. at 655–56. 
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 652, 656. 
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for inclusion in New York’s DNA database.11  It forbade the 
State of New York from cataloguing medically significant 
DNA,12 and further restricted the government to cataloguing 
only those strands of an individual’s DNA “having value for 
law enforcement identification purposes.”13  Once 
catalogued, however, the government could use a record in its 
DNA database for any of several purposes: to help solve any 
crime,14 identify human remains,15 exonerate a criminal 
defendant,16 or conduct research.17  To keep government 
actors from misusing database records, the statute 
criminalized any unauthorized use or unauthorized disclosure 
of a record.18  The statute also required the government to 
expunge an individual’s DNA record if the individual 
received a pardon or if his conviction was overturned.19  But 
the statute permitted the government to keep an individual’s 
DNA record indefinitely if he left custody in almost any other 
manner, including through normal release.20 
When Nicholas came before a magistrate judge, the 
defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).21  The magistrate judge, assessing the plaintiffs’ 
Fourth Amendment claim under a “special needs” test,22 
recommended that the motion be granted.23  A district judge 
then reached the same conclusion by a different route.  He 
assessed the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim under a 
balancing test24 instead of the special needs test, but he 
                                                 
11 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(3) (McKinney 2004). 
12 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 655. 
13 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995-c(5). 
14 Id. § 995-c(6)(a). 
15 Id. § 995-c(6)(a). 
16 Id. § 995-c(6)(b). 
17 N.Y. EXEC. LAW section 995-c(6)(c) (McKinney 2004). 
18 Id. § 995-f. 
19 Id. § 995-c(9). 
20 See id. (requiring the government to expunge a record only “[u]pon 
receipt of notification of a reversal of a conviction, or of the granting of a 
pardon . . . [or] other appropriate circumstances”). 
21 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 2005). 
22 See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
23 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 656–57. 
24 See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
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ultimately dismissed the case.25  The plaintiffs appealed.26  
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit heard their appeal, several of the plaintiffs finished 
serving their prison sentences and were released from the 
government’s custody.27 
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.28  For a search29 to be 
reasonable, an agent of the government ordinarily must 
receive permission to conduct it.  Permission may come in 
either of two forms: an individual may voluntarily consent to 
be searched, or a magistrate may issue a search warrant.30  
Although a search warrant obviates the need for voluntary 
consent, its availability actually serves to limit the 
government’s power.  The government usually must obtain a 
warrant if it fails to gain consent,31 and relatively few 
circumstances exist under which the government may obtain 
a warrant.  As the Fourth Amendment decrees, “no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause.”32  
The Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to 
contain a “few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions” to the requirement of either voluntary consent or 
a warrant.33  The Court developed these exceptions in a series 
of cases beginning with Terry v. Ohio.34  Terry came before 
                                                 
25 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 657. 
26 Id. at 655, 657. 
27 Id. at 666 n.25, 671 n.32. 
28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
29 A search is constitutionally indistinguishable from a seizure.  
Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 673 n.1 (Leval, J., concurring). For simplicity, this 
Case Note refers either to a search or a seizure as a “search.” 
30 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) 
(granting permission through voluntary consent); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (granting permission through a search warrant). 
31 E.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390. 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
33 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 660 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390). 
34 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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the Court after a police officer patted down the outer layer of 
clothing on an individual whom the officer reasonably 
suspected of concealing a gun.35  The officer had not obtained 
a warrant before patting down the man’s clothing.36  The 
Court held the pat down to be a constitutionally cognizable 
search, but it refused immediately to hold the search 
unconstitutional for lack of a warrant.  Instead, the Court 
analyzed the search’s constitutionality through a balancing 
test.  The Court weighed the officer’s invasion of the 
suspect’s privacy against the officer’s reasonable suspicion of 
a concealed gun and the danger that a hidden lethal weapon 
could pose to the officer and to the general public.37  The 
Court upheld the search.38  
The Court went one step further in United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte
39 where it upheld a warrantless search even 
though the search had been based on no suspicion at all.40  
Martinez-Fuerte arose after the United States Border Patrol 
caught two individuals attempting to smuggle undocumented 
aliens through a permanent, clearly advertised checkpoint 
near the U.S.-Mexico border.41  The Border Patrol caught the 
individuals by searching their vehicles, but it had not 
possessed any particularized suspicion when it commenced 
the search; “the flow of traffic tend[ed] to be too heavy to 
allow the particularized study of a given car that would 
enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal 
aliens.”42  Despite the absence of a warrant and the absence 
even of suspicion, the Court once again refused immediately 
to hold the search unconstitutional.  Rather, it once again 
assessed the search’s constitutionality under a balancing test.  
Noting that a requirement even of reasonable suspicion would 
                                                 
35 Id. at 6–7. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 23–24, 28, 29–30 (assessing the reasonableness of the 
decision to search and the reasonableness of the extent of the search). 
38 Id. at 30–31. 
39 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
40 Id. at 545, 562, 566. 
41 Id. at 545–47 (describing the checkpoint and the systematic 
inspections). 
42 Id. at 557. 
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have been impractical under the circumstances, the Court 
upheld the search because the government’s interest in 
securing the nation’s borders outweighs a driver’s interest in 
privacy.43 
The Court’s warrantless search jurisprudence took a new 
turn in New Jersey v. T.L.O.44 Before T.L.O., the Court had 
assessed a warrantless search simply by balancing the 
government’s interest in conducting the search against an 
individual’s countervailing interest in privacy.45  The 
majority of the Court actually continued to apply this test in 
T.L.O., but Justice Blackmun argued persuasively in 
concurrence to modify the test.46  He noted that the Fourth 
Amendment’s Framers had emphasized the importance of a 
search warrant.47  To be true to the Framers’ intent, the Court 
therefore should require the government to obtain a warrant 
except in the rare circumstances when the relatively long 
process of obtaining a warrant would frustrate the 
government’s very need for it.48  Although Justice Blackmun 
would continue to employ a Fourth Amendment balancing 
test, he would invoke the test only after the Court ensured 
that “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable.”49  
During the sixteen years following T.L.O., the Court 
repeatedly invoked Justice Blackmun’s “special needs” test to 
assess warrantless searches.50  The Second Circuit followed 
                                                 
43 Id. at 557, 561–62. 
44 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
45 See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561–62 (balancing the 
government’s interest to search against a driver’s privacy interest). 
46 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
47 Id. at 351 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722 
(1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
48 Id.  
49 Id. 
50 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873–80 (1987) (invoking 
the special needs test to uphold the warrantless search of a probationer’s 
home); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42–45, 46–47 
(2000) (holding that a roadside police checkpoint for narcotics did not 
serve an ordinary law enforcement need); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
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suit.51  Recently, however, the Court cast doubt upon the 
special needs test’s continued validity.  The Court muddied 
the waters in United States v. Knights.52  In Knights, a man on 
probation challenged the constitutionality of a warrantless 
search.53  A police officer had searched the probationer’s 
home because he reasonably suspected the home contained 
evidence linking the probationer to a recent arson.54  Rather 
than applying the special needs test, the Court simply 
balanced the probationer’s privacy interest against the 
government’s search interests.55  As the Court reasoned, the 
probationer enjoyed only a reduced privacy interest, even in 
his home, because as a probationer he remained under the 
state’s supervision.56  On the other side of the balance, the 
government possessed a strong interest to operate the penal 
system of which the probationer was part.57  The police 
officer held a reasonable suspicion of the probationer’s guilt 
at the time of the search.58  In light of these factors, the Court 
upheld the search.59  The Court explicitly left open the 
question of whether the government may conduct an entirely 
suspicionless search of a probationer’s home.60 
The DNA-indexing statutes fit squarely into the hole left 
open by Knights because they authorize suspicionless 
searches of individuals in government custody.61  Although 
                                                                                                     
532 U.S. 67, 79–86 (2001) (invoking the special needs test to strike down 
suspicionless, systematic drug tests of pregnant women in a hospital). 
51 See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (invoking 
the special needs test to uphold Connecticut’s DNA-indexing statute). 
52 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
53 Id. at 116. 
54 See id. at 115 (describing the circumstances that gave rise to the 
officer’s reasonable suspicion). 
55 See id. at 118–21 (invoking a general balancing test). 
56 Id. at 119–20. 
57 Id. at 120–21. 
58 Id. at 122. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 120 (“[W]e need not address the constitutionality of a 
suspicionless search because the search in this case was supported by 
reasonable suspicion.”). 
61 To be sure, the Court did decide a case shortly after Knights that 
involved a suspicionless seizure. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 
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the Court shunned Justice Blackmun’s special needs test in 
Knights in favor of a balancing test, the Court did not openly 
reject the special needs test.  The resulting ambiguity has 
inspired sharp disagreement among federal circuit courts 
assessing the constitutionality of DNA-indexing statutes.  The 
Third,62 Fifth,63 and Eleventh64 Circuits have opted to assess 
the statutes’ validity under a balancing test.  The Seventh65 
and Tenth66 Circuits have chosen the special needs test.  The 
Ninth Circuit has resolutely failed to choose a test, 
deadlocking on the issue while sitting en banc.67  
Interestingly, every circuit court to consider a DNA-indexing 
statute has upheld it.68 
 
III. HOLDING 
 
In Nicholas v. Goord, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit upheld New York’s DNA-indexing 
statute under the special needs test.69  Reviewing the district 
court’s judgment de novo,70 the court commenced its analysis 
by noting that the statute authorized searches that were 
                                                                                                     
(2004). But the seizure at issue in that case occurred in the context of a 
highway traffic checkpoint in which police officers seized ordinary 
citizens who were not in the government’s custody. Id. at 422. The case 
therefore sheds no light into whether the government may conduct a 
suspicionless search of an individual who is in the government’s custody.  
62 United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). 
63 Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 
2004) (per curiam). 
64 Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2005). 
65 Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2004). 
66 United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003). 
67 Compare United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 
2004) (O’Scannlain, J.) (plurality opinion) (voting for the balancing test), 
with id. at 840 (Gould, J., concurring) (voting for the special needs test) 
and id. at 857 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (invoking the special needs test) 
and id. at 872–73 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing against the balancing 
test) and id. at 875 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (voting for the special needs 
test). 
68 Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005). 
69 Id. at 672. 
70 Id. at 657. 
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constitutionally cognizable under the Fourth Amendment.71 
Because the statute implicated the Fourth Amendment, the 
court recognized that it needed to assess the statute’s 
constitutionality under either the special needs test or the 
general balancing test.72 Although the Second Circuit adopted 
the special needs test only six years earlier,73 the court 
revisited the issue in light of several intervening Supreme 
Court cases and the fairly even split among its sister circuit 
courts.74  
To guide its decision, the court examined past warrantless 
search cases.  It focused particularly upon suspicionless 
search cases.75 After surveying the modern suspicionless 
search cases, the court held that the analysis in every modern 
suspicionless search case conforms to the special needs test.76  
Moreover, Knights had not altered the playing field.77  As the 
court elucidated, Knights involved a search undertaken with 
reasonable suspicion; the case was inapposite to suspicionless 
search cases.78  To comply with the relevant line of authority, 
the court adopted the special needs test.79 
After the court adopted the special needs test, it applied a 
version of the test to New York’s DNA-indexing statute.80  
                                                 
71 Id. at 658 (“[T]he extraction and analysis of plaintiffs’ blood for 
DNA-indexing purposes constituted a search implicating the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
72 Id. 
73 See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 78–82 (2d Cir. 1999) (invoking 
the special needs test to uphold Connecticut’s DNA-indexing statute). 
74 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 659–60. 
75 Id. at 660–63. 
76 Id. at 661 (“What unifies these cases, despite their varied contexts, 
is that in each instance, the Court found that the suspicionless-search 
regime at issue served some special need distinct from normal law-
enforcement needs.”). As a note, the Supreme Court has applied a general 
balancing test in one Fourth Amendment case since Nicholas.  See 
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).  However, Samson does not 
overrule Nicholas: it adjudicates the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
parolee rather than a prison inmate.  United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 
73, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007). 
77 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 665, 666. 
78 Id. at 665–66. 
79 Id. at 667. 
80 Id. at 667–72. 
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Unlike Justice Blackmun’s special needs test, the court’s 
formulation of the test does not require the process of 
obtaining a warrant to cause the warrant to be impractical to 
obtain.81  Instead, the court’s test examines only whether the 
government possesses a need, apart from ordinary law 
enforcement, to conduct a suspicionless search.82  The court 
held that New York’s DNA-indexing statute served such a 
need: “to assist in solving crimes.”83  As the court explained, 
using a DNA database to help solve crimes serves a need 
apart from ordinary law enforcement because, “at the time of 
collection, the [DNA] samples . . . provide no evidence in and 
of themselves of criminal wrongdoing, and are not sought for 
the investigation of a specific crime.”84 
The court then considered the searches’ reasonableness 
under its articulation of the special needs test.85  The court 
ruled that New York had possessed a strong interest to build 
and maintain a DNA database because the database improved 
the accuracy of evidence in some criminal proceedings, 
helped to catch ex-convicts who perpetrated new crimes, and 
discouraged recidivism.86  On the other side of the balance, 
the statute infringed on a prison inmate’s privacy interest in 
two ways: First, the statute required a prison inmate to give 
up bodily fluids;87 and second, the statute authorized New 
York to “analyze[] DNA for information and maintain[] DNA 
records indefinitely.”88  
The court separately considered the two invasions of 
privacy.  First, the court assessed the degree to which the 
mandatory extraction of an inmate’s bodily fluids invades his 
                                                 
81 Id. at 672.  The court held a warrant was impractical to obtain 
under New York’s statute only because “[o]btaining a warrant requires 
probable cause, which obviously does not exist in the context of 
suspicionless searches.” Id. at 671 (internal citation omitted). 
82 Id. at 667–69. 
83 Id. at 668. 
84 Id. at 669 (quoting Nicholas v. Goord, Report-Recommendation, 
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1621, at 13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003). 
85
 Id. at 669–71. 
86 Id. at 669. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 670. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy.89  The court held that such 
an extraction constitutes only a minimal invasion; “inmates 
are routinely subject to medical procedures, including blood 
draws.”90  The court weighed this minimal intrusion against 
the government’s strong interest in collecting an inmate’s 
DNA, and it upheld the statute’s mandatory DNA 
extractions.91  
Next, the court assessed the degree to which the analysis 
of, and indefinite storage of, an inmate’s DNA markers 
intrudes on his reasonable expectation of privacy.92  Because 
New York’s statute forbade the government from analyzing 
or maintaining medically significant strands of DNA, the 
court described a DNA record as strongly resembling a 
fingerprint; both devices merely serve as a means by which to 
identify a person.93  The government already maintains a 
constitutionally permissible fingerprint database, to which 
even a mere arrestee’s fingerprints may permanently be 
added.94  Given that the government may forever keep the 
fingerprints of a mere arrestee, the government’s indefinite 
storage of a convicted felon’s DNA constituted a “relatively 
minimal” invasion of privacy.95  Thus, New York’s DNA-
indexing statute was valid in its entirety.  The court affirmed 
the district court’s judgment.96 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct 
to adopt the special needs test in Nicholas.  However, in 
applying that test, the court unfortunately strayed from 
Supreme Court precedent by refusing to stipulate that, for a 
                                                 
89 Id. at 669. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 670. 
93 Id. at 671. 
94
 Id.  
95 Id. at 671.  
96 Id. at 672. 
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warrantless search to be reasonable, a warrant must be 
impractical to obtain.  
 
A.  Propriety of the Special Needs Test 
 
The circuit courts have split on whether to analyze the 
constitutionality of DNA-indexing statutes under a balancing 
test or the special needs test.97  The courts’ disagreement 
centers on whether the Supreme Court’s holding in United 
States v. Knights extends from a reasonable-suspicion search 
of a probationer to a suspicionless search of a prison inmate.  
In Nicholas, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
correctly rejected Knights’s applicability.  The court then 
properly followed controlling authority when it adopted the 
special needs test. 
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, a reasonable-
suspicion search differs from a suspicionless search in a 
constitutionally significant manner.98  Since Nicholas 
involved a suspicionless search while Knights involved a 
reasonable-suspicion search, the cases turned on 
constitutionally distinct facts.  Because the cases turned on 
constitutionally distinct facts, the Second Circuit was correct 
to hold that Knights did not bind its decision of which test to 
use.99  
When the Second Circuit ultimately adopted the special 
needs test, it correctly followed controlling authority.  The 
Supreme Court often has invoked the special needs test, 
either implicitly or explicitly, to adjudicate suspicionless 
search cases.100 Because Knights did not overrule this 
authority, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was 
correct to follow it in Nicholas.  Also, although a court’s own 
                                                 
97 See cases cited supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
98 See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 n.6 (2001) 
(considering a reasonable-suspicion search; reserving judgment on 
whether a suspicionless search would pass constitutional muster). 
99 See United States ex rel. Kustas v. Williams, 194 F.2d 642, 643 (2d 
Cir. 1952) (refusing to apply as precedent a Supreme Court case turned on 
constitutionally distinct facts). 
100 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42–45, 46–
47 (2000). 
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earlier decisions do not bind it absolutely, the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Nicholas to abide by its six-year-old 
precedent had the positive effect of contributing to the 
predictability of law. 
 
B.    Requiring a Warrant to be Impractical to 
Obtain 
 
Although the court was correct to invoke the special 
needs test, it strayed from Supreme Court precedent when 
applying the test.  Under Justice Blackmun’s special needs 
test, a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable 
unless: (1) the search serves a special government need aside 
from ordinary law enforcement; and (2) because of that need, 
a warrant is impractical to obtain.101  The latter requirement is 
important because it narrows the government’s ability to 
search without a warrant.  By doing so, it gives effect to the 
Framers’ intent to enshrine probable cause as the usual 
standard for the government to meet before it searches an 
individual.102  
Under the Second Circuit’s formulation of the special 
needs test, however, a search is presumptively unreasonable 
unless the search serves a special government need aside 
from ordinary law enforcement.103  For all searches serving 
purposes outside the solitary realm of law enforcement, this 
test collapses into a mere balancing test.  Under the balancing 
test, the government may sidestep the Warrant Clause so long 
as its interests in conducting a search outweigh an 
individual’s privacy interest.104  Yet such a low threshold 
runs counter to Supreme Court precedent.  The Supreme 
Court turned away from such a balancing test because its 
laxity undermines the Framers’ intent to require a warrant 
and probable cause in all but impractical circumstances. To 
                                                 
101 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
102 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
103 See id. at 667 (discussing Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74, 78, 79 
(2d Cir. 1999)). 
104 See cases cited supra notes 67–69. 
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follow the Court’s controlling line of precedent and to abide 
by the Framers’ intent, the Second Circuit should have 
stipulated that a warrantless search is presumptively 
unreasonable unless, under the circumstances surrounding the 
search, a warrant is impractical for the government to obtain. 
Separately, in dictum, the court leaves language that 
would become troubling if another court were to pick it up.  
The court notes that New York’s DNA-indexing statute 
called for suspicionless searches, which fail probable 
cause.105  Because a magistrate may issue a warrant only 
upon a showing of probable cause, no warrant could issue to 
implement the statute.106   
This language is troubling because, if a court were ever to 
adopt it, all reasonable-suspicion searches and suspicionless 
searches under a statute like New York’s DNA-indexing 
statute would immediately satisfy the special needs test’s 
impracticality requirement. Under such analysis, the 
requirement of impracticality would be almost meaningless.  
The government would become much freer to search 
individuals without a warrant or probable cause, undermining 
the Fourth Amendment.107  A court would be more faithful to 
the Framers’ intent by following Justice Blackmun’s 
articulation of the special needs test. Under that articulation, a 
warrant is not impractical to obtain merely because a search 
fails probable cause; rather, as in T.L.O., the time-consuming 
process of obtaining a warrant must defeat the government’s 
very need for it.108  
                                                 
105 Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 671. 
106 Id. 
107 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
108 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). There, the Court 
held:  
Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads 
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom 
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as 
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing 
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
In Nicholas v. Goord, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit adjudicated a Fourth Amendment 
challenge to New York’s DNA-indexing statute.  The statute 
authorized suspicionless, warrantless searches of convicted 
felons’ DNA.  To assess the statute’s constitutionality, the 
court had to invoke either a Fourth Amendment balancing 
test or a “special needs” test to assess the statute’s 
constitutionality.  Nimbly untangling a messy knot of 
precedent, the court properly followed the Supreme Court 
and paid heed to its own prior rulings by choosing to apply 
the special needs test.  
When it applied the special needs test, however, the court 
strayed from Supreme Court precedent by refusing to 
consider a warrantless search to be presumptively 
unreasonable unless the warrant were impractical to obtain.  
This omission opens the door to a host of warrantless 
searches that would strike against the Fourth Amendment 
Framers’ intent to enshrine probable cause and a warrant as 
the usual prerequisites to a constitutionally valid search. The 
Second Circuit instead should have clarified that a 
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless the 
time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant would defeat 
the government’s very need for it.  
In coming years, DNA-indexing statutes likely will be a 
prominent and growing issue in the law.  With hope, future 
courts will adopt the well-reasoned aspects of Nicholas v. 
Goord but will cast aside the case’s more questionable 
analysis. 
                                                                                                     
the protection of himself and  others in the area to conduct a 
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in 
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him. 
